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Abstract 
 
This paper employs two widely used approaches to estimate the effects of 
monetary policy on seven measures of unemployment. Evidence from recursive vector 
autoregressions and autoregressive distributed lag models that use information on the 
Federal Reserve’s contractionary initiatives indicate that the weeks of unemployment 
distribution (e.g., less than five weeks) is significantly altered. The number of 
unemployed increases at all segments of the distribution. However, as a share of total 
unemployment, the increase is greatest among those with 15 weeks of unemployment or 
more. The number of job losers on both temporary and permanent layoff rise, with over 
two-thirds of the increase among permanent job losers. The number of reentrants into the 
labor force, new entrants and part-time workers that become unemployed also rises. The 
share of the unemployed that are job losers rises, while the shares of reentrant, new 
entrant and part-time workers that become unemployed falls. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the impact that contractionary monetary policy as measured 
by an increase in the federal funds rate has on a variety of measures of unemployment. 
To my knowledge, this study is the first to estimate using recursive vector 
autoregressions and autoregressive distributed lag models the relationship between 
contractionary monetary policy’s impact on the duration of unemployment, and how the 
composition of the unemployed changes. However, the paper does add to a literature that 
identifies monetary policy’s differential impacts on labor market outcomes such as the 
employment-population ratios, unemployment rates, and labor force participation rates of 
minorities, less-educated and less-skilled individuals.1 The analysis also adds to the large 
and well-developed literature that identifies different relationships between aggregate 
demand, macroeconomic policies and the economic outcomes (e.g., poverty) of various 
socio-economic groups.2,3   
Monetary policy’s impact on socioeconomic outcomes is not a recent focus of 
researchers. For example, Romer and Romer (1998) find that expansionary monetary 
policy tends to lessen poverty. In the long run, low inflation and steady growth in 
aggregate demand is associated with lower poverty. Romer and Romer conclude that 
since the effects of monetary policy are “inherently temporary,” a strategy with the goals 
of low inflation and stable aggregate demand has the greatest chance to permanently 
lower poverty. 
Most recently, building on Thorbecke (2001), Carpenter and Rodgers 
(Forthcoming, 2004) find that evidence from recursive vector autoregressions and 
autoregressive distributed lag models that use information on the Federal Reserve’s 
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contractionary initiatives indicate that the employment-population ratio of minorities is 
more sensitive to contractionary monetary policy than that of whites: the ratio falls 
primarily because of an increase in unemployment and not because of a decline in labor 
force participation. Monetary policy appears to have a disproportionate effect on the 
unemployment rate of teenagers, particularly African American teenagers. Their 
employment-population ratios fall because of increased difficulty in obtaining 
employment. 
Why might contractionary monetary policy affect the duration of unemployment 
and the composition of the unemployed? The basic job search model developed in 
Mortensen (1970) can be used to answer this question. An increase in the federal funds 
rates creates excess labor supply. As a result, firms may decrease the size of their 
workforces by raising their skill requirements and by not raising their relative wage 
offers. Raising the skill requirements lessens the proportion of jobs open to every 
unemployed person. Keeping wages constant reduces the number of wage offers that 
exceed the reservation wages of the unemployed. 
As a result, the contractionary policy has a ripple effect throughout the weeks of 
unemployment distribution. The least skilled workers become short-term unemployed. 
The likelihood of exiting unemployment for short-term unemployed falls because their 
labor market prospects worsen. These individuals become medium-term unemployed. 
The employment prospects of medium-term unemployed also deteriorate. They become 
long-term unemployed. The long-term unemployed remain out of work because their 
prospects deteriorate. The contractionary policy also impacts the reasons individuals cite 
for being unemployed. The absolute and relative (compared to job quitters) number of job 
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losers increases. New entrants and reentrants to the labor force have a more difficult time 
securing employment. As firms make their workforces smaller, part-time workers will 
lose their jobs. 
This paper uses VARs and Romer and Romer (1989, 1994a, the so-called “Romer 
dates”) and data from March 1973 to September 2002 to describe how contractionary 
monetary policy changes the nature of unemployment. I focus on unemployment because 
previous work finds that monetary policy acts to make it more difficult to find 
employment, but not enough such that individuals leave the labor force in large numbers 
(Carpenter and Rodgers, Forthcoming, 2004; Thorbecke, 2001). 
The results show that contractionary monetary policy raises the number of 
unemployed at all segments of the distribution. However, as a share of the total number 
of unemployed individuals, the increase is greatest among those that have been 
unemployed 15 weeks or more. 
The number of job losers on both temporary and permanent layoff rise, with over 
two-thirds of the increase among permanent job losers. The number of reentrants and new 
entrants into the labor force and part-time workers that become unemployed also rises. 
The share of the unemployed that are job losers rises, while the shares of reentrant, new 
entrant and part-time workers that become unemployed falls. 
Methods 
Estimation4 
 
VARs are a convenient and popular econometric modeling technique used in 
analyzing macroeconomics and the impact of monetary policy in particular.  Consider a 
general linear model of the economy: 
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where tY is a vector of variables summarizing the state of the economy.  Re-arranging the 
equation in reduced form yields only lagged values on the right hand side: 
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The system is estimated with OLS equation by equation.  The federal funds rate is 
the measure of monetary policy, following Bernanke and Blinder (1992).  While this 
measure is open to debate, I choose it because the federal funds rate is fairly standard and 
parsimonious relative to a more elaborate measure (see for instance Bernanke and Mihov, 
1998).  Although the federal funds rate was not the principal instrument of the Fed from 
1979 to 1982 when reserves were targeted, it was the main instrument in the rest of the 
sample.  Even when reserves were targeted, the funds rate was never ignored.  While 
some studies have tried to isolate the best measure of monetary policy, for the current 
study, this more simple measure suffices. 
In a VAR, it is presumed that all variables are endogenous.  The OLS residuals 
represent unforecastable innovations to each of the variables in the system.  Identification 
of exogenous shocks, such as a policy change I seek to examine here, typically comes 
from contemporaneous restrictions imposed on the system.  Here, I impose a simple 
recursive structure on the system.  The impulse response functions result from a Cholesky 
decomposition with the funds rate ordered last.  This implies that actions by the Fed are 
informed by developments in the economy, but policy is only effective with a lag.  Re-
ordering the variables to place the federal funds rate first does not change any of the 
qualitative results.  Moreover, we are only interested in identifying the effects of 
monetary policy on the rest of the economy so I omit a structural identification strategy. 
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The variables in the VAR are ordered as follows: industrial production growth, 
the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, the Commodity 
Research Board spot price index, a measure of unemployment (e.g. weeks of 
unemployment), the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves.  
Industrial production growth, the percent change in the Consumer Price Index, the spot 
price index, and the labor market outcome describe the goods markets.  The federal funds 
rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves capture the Federal Reserve’s policy 
instruments.5 
To identify the response of unemployment to an increase in the federal funds rate, 
we estimate a VAR and impulse response functions for each measure of unemployment 
(for example, weeks of unemployment distribution). For example, the impulse response 
functions simulate the effect of an increase in the federal funds rate on the four segments 
of the weeks of unemployment distribution for which the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
publishes data: less than 5 weeks, 5 to 14 weeks, 15 or more weeks, and 27 or more 
weeks of unemployment. Because of these relations, I will be able to show the ripple 
effects that contractionary monetary policy has throughout the weeks of unemployment 
distribution. 
The Impact of Contractionary Episodes on Labor Market Outcomes 
 Another approach to identifying the impact of monetary policy on labor markets 
is to examine episodes in which there was a distinct change in policy by the Federal 
Reserve.  Romer and Romer (1989, 1994b) examine records of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) policy deliberations through 1988 and identify times when “the 
Federal Reserve attempted to exert a contractionary influence on the economy in order to 
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reduce inflation.”  This definition includes only those times when the FOMC could be 
construed to have intentionally changed policy to exert restraint on the economy in order 
to reduce current or expected inflation.  Romer and Romer (1989, 1994b) identified 
1947:10, 1955:09, 1968:12, 1974:04, 1978:08, 1979:10, and 1988:12 as meeting their 
criteria for a contractionary episode. 
The minutes from FOMC meetings in February 1994 and June 1999 suggest that 
these two episodes also fit the criteria used by the Romers in their papers.  From reading 
the minutes, it seems clear that the FOMC intentionally changed the stance of monetary 
policy towards a much less accommodative position in order to slow the economy and 
ward off inflation. 
To identify the effect that these contractionary episodes have on a particular 
demographic group, I estimate: 
4) ,)()()( 111 −−− ++= tttt DLCLByLAy π  
where yt denotes a type of unemployment, A(L) and B(L) are unrestricted polynomials in 
the lag operator L, πt denotes the percent change in the consumer price index for urban 
consumers, C(L) is estimated as a fourth-order polynomial distributed lag, and Dt 
represents dummy variables for the Romer dates plus the two that we identified.  The 
A(L) and B(L)  polynomials contain seven lags.  The impact of the Romer and Romer 
dates on yt are robust to changes in the order of A(L) and B(L).  To maintain consistency 
with the VARs, C(L) has 48 lags. 
III. Data 
The measures of unemployment that I analyze are weeks of unemployment, the 
number of the unemployed that are job losers, reentrants into the labor force, job quitters, 
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new entrants and were working part-time prior to becoming unemployed. The series 
come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Monthly data for all individuals 16 
years of age and over is available from January 1959 to September 2002. However, to 
maintain comparability with Carpenter and Rodgers (Forthcoming, 2004) and Thorbecke 
(2001), I focus on the period since March 1973. The unemployment series are available 
for the total number of people unemployed, the number unemployed for less than 5 
weeks, the number unemployed 5 to 14 weeks, the number unemployed 15 weeks or 
more, and the number unemployed 27 weeks or more. From these series, I create the 
share of unemployment at each segment of the distribution. 
The BLS sorts unemployed individuals into several categories of unemployment. 
I focus on six of the major categories. Job losers are unemployed persons who lost their 
last job or who had completed a temporary job. This includes persons on temporary 
layoff and persons not on temporary layoff. Among those not on temporary layoff are 
permanent job losers and those whose temporary jobs had ended. New entrants are 
unemployed persons who have never worked before and are entering the labor force for 
the first time. Reentrants are unemployed persons who have previously worked but were 
out of the labor force prior to beginning their job search. Job leavers or quitters are 
unemployed individuals that have initiated the departure from their establishment. A 
resignation from a job is placed in this category. The BLS also identifies unemployed 
individuals who previously held part-time employment, where part-time employment is 
defined as usually working between 1 and 34 hours per week (at all jobs within an 
establishment) regardless of the number of hours worked in the reference week. 
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A potential drawback to the unemployment data is the common censoring 
problem that duration data possesses. A portion of the spells of unemployment will end 
during the following month, while another portion will continue into the future. If 
monetary policy’s impacts on the probability of a spell ending are uniform across the four 
categories of length and types of unemployment, then our estimates will remain unbiased, 
but, if monetary policy affects the censoring differently, then the estimates from the VAR 
and PDL models will be biased. A priori, I have no reason to believe that an increase in 
the federal funds rate would have differential impacts on the censoring of the spells 
across the distribution or type of unemployment. 
Monthly time-series data for the federal funds rate, industrial production, total 
reserves, and nonborrowed reserves come from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
(Federal Reserve, 2004). Monthly values for the CPI-U come from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the monthly spot price index comes from the Commodity Research Board. I 
used industrial production instead of the GDP and the CPI-U instead of the GDP deflator. 
Industrial production and the CPI-U are available monthly while GDP and the GDP 
deflator are only available quarterly. 
In general, residuals from each equation of the VARs are relatively stable over 
this period, typically remaining within two-standard deviations. The only series that are 
less stable are nonborrowed and total reserve series. The residuals two months after 
September 11, 2001, are quite large, but quickly return to lying within 2 standard 
deviations. The response of the Federal Reserve to the extraordinary events of September 
11, 2001, explain their size, as the Fed injected extremely large amounts of reserves into 
the federal funds market to maintain market liquidity.6, 7, 8 
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IV. Results 
 
 The impulse response functions shown in Figure 1 indicate that a one-standard-
deviation innovation to the federal funds rate (123 to 125 basis points) leads to a growth 
in the number of unemployed at all segments of the weeks of unemployment 
distribution.9 More specifically, at 5 weeks of unemployment or less, the growth in the 
number of unemployed peaks at just above 17,000 in months 14 to 19. At 5 to 14 weeks 
of unemployment, the growth in unemployment reaches a maximum of 28,000 people. At 
15 or more and 27 weeks or more (what labor economist consider to be long-term 
unemployment), growth in unemployment peaks at 65,000 and 46,000 people.10  
Figure 2 shows in percentage terms, how the shape of the unemployment 
distribution changes. Although the number of unemployed for less than 5 weeks 
increases, as a share of total unemployment it falls, reaching a maximum of 0.23 
percentage points in the 24th month. For 5 to 14 weeks of unemployment, the same 
increase in the federal funds rate increases the share by only 0.10 percentage points. For 
15 and 27 or more weeks of unemployment, a one-standard deviation innovation in the 
federal funds rate increases the shares of unemployment at these segments by 0.29 and 
0.26 percentage points, with the peaks both reached during the 24th and 25th months. 
To illustrate the impacts of contractionary monetary policy on the types of 
unemployment, Figure 3 plots the impact a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal 
funds rate has on all job losers and job losers on temporary layoff. Permanent job losers 
comprise the difference between these two groups. The figure indicates that 
contractionary monetary policy leads to an increase in both the total number and share (as 
percent of all unemployed) of job losers. The increase peaks at 104,000 in the 13th month, 
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with lower and upper bounds of 47,000 and 167,000. Among job loses on temporary 
layoff, a peak of 36,000 occurs in the 13th month. The bounds are 18,000 and 54,000 
individuals. These estimates suggest that the maximum increase is comprised of 68,000 
permanently unemployed individuals. All eventually find employment; however, two-
thirds of the new job losers will probably not return to their previous employer. 
It is worthy to note that job losers’ share of all unemployed individuals rises as a 
result of contractionary policy, peaking at 0.43 percent in the 12th month. The share of 
job losers on temporary layoff increases, but the increase is only around one-half of the 
increase for all job losers. 
Figure 4 reports the impact of contractionary monetary policy on individuals who 
were employed in part-time jobs prior to the policy innovation. Although the percent of 
all unemployed shrinks, the absolute number increases and peaks at 61,000 in the 19th 
month, with lower and upper bounds of 22,000 and 101,000. The pool of labor force new 
entrants that cannot find a job and become unemployed also increases in absolute terms, 
but falls as a share of all unemployed individuals. The increase is approximately 5,500. 
The lower bound suggests that no increase has a likely change of occurring. Figure 5 
shows that reentrants to the labor force have greater difficulty finding a job. Their 
unemployment rises and peaks at just over 10,000, with a lower bound indicating that no 
increase could occur. 
Finally, as a check for model consistency, I constructed the impulse response 
function for job quitters. Since individuals are the catalysts for this type of separation, I 
expect that there should be little if any relationship between contractionary monetary 
policy and the decisions of job quitters to separate from their establishment.11 The 
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estimates in Figure 5 support this hypothesis. There is no discernable relationship that is 
statistically significant. 
Isolating Contractionary Episodes 
 Table 1 presents the ADL results from specifications that use the updated “Romer 
and Romer dates”. Similar to the VAR results, the number of unemployed increases at all 
segments of the distribution, with the largest increases occurring at the 5 to 14 and 15 or 
more segments. A contractionary episode leads to a peak increase of 26,046 people with 
less than 5 weeks of unemployment, 53,290 between 5 to14 weeks, 42,555 with 15 or 
more weeks, and 29,760 with 27 or more weeks of unemployment. All of the estimates 
are significant at the 95 percent level, except for the estimate at less than 5 weeks of 
unemployment.  The estimates from the ADL exceed those from the VARs because the 
federal funds rate’s variation during disinflationary episodes is larger than the variation of 
the federal funds rate in the time series of the VARs. 
 The specifications using the share of the unemployed as the labor market outcome 
are also similar in nature to the VARs. The share of unemployment that is less than five 
weeks reaches its maximum decrease of 0.92 percentage points in the 29th and 30th 
months. The share of unemployment between 5 to 14 weeks increases, hitting a 
maximum of 0.41 percentage points in the 22nd month. The shares of unemployment that 
are 15 or more weeks and 27 or more weeks peak at 0.53 and 0.39 percentage points. All 
of the estimates except at 5 to 14 weeks are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. 
The estimate at the 5 to 14 weeks segment just fails the 95 percent test of significance. 
The estimates from the VAR and ADL models show that in a “macroeconomics 
sense”, monetary policy’s impacts are short nature. The number of unemployed grows, 
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but returns to its pre-innovation value by the end of the forecast period. Yet, from the 
standpoint of a labor economist, the economic impacts are long-term, especially for the 
long-term unemployed (more than 27 weeks). Spells of unemployment weaken 
employment stability, particularly for those with the least skills, such as youth and less-
educated individuals. It is well documented that a lack of employment stability, which 
leads to breaks in job tenure and experience has adverse impacts on wage growth. 
The ADLs for the different types of unemployment are consistent with the 
previous findings. Table 2 reports the changes in the number and share of job losers, job 
losers on layoff, reentrants into the labor force, job quitters, and new entrants and 
individuals that were working part-time prior to losing their job. The estimates are largest 
for job losers, followed by job losers on layoff. Again, the difference between these 
measures of unemployment measures permanent job losers. Because of that, the estimates 
in Table 2 indicate that permanent job losers comprise the biggest expansion in the 
number of unemployed. The estimates have a high degree of precision. Reentrants into 
the labor force, new entrants, and part-time workers all see their numbers rise as a result 
of a contractionary episode. Their shares of all unemployed individuals fall. The results 
for job quitters are similar to the results from the VAR. They are not related to 
contractionary monetary policy. 
V.  Summary 
This paper estimates the extent to which contractionary monetary policy alters the 
weeks of unemployment distribution and six types of unemployment. Using recursive 
VARs, I find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate raises the 
number of unemployed at all segments of the distribution, with the largest effects in 
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percentage terms occurring at the less than 5 weeks segment. I then show the effects on 
the weeks of unemployment distribution associated with a contractionary episode. They 
too, reveal that the number of unemployed increases at all segments of the distribution.  
I also show that the number of job losers, both temporary and permanent rise, 
with the largest increase occurring among permanent job losers. The number of reentrants 
into the labor force, new entrants and part-time workers that become unemployed also 
rises. The share of the unemployed that are job losers also rises, but as a share of the 
unemployed they fall. Estimates from ADL models yield similar findings. 
Even though in a “macroeconomic sense”, disinflationary monetary policy’s 
effects are short-term in nature, the evidence in this paper demonstrates that they have 
real and lasting effects on employment stability. These effects are felt throughout the 
distribution, generating new spells and extending spells of both short and long-term 
unemployment. Potentially, most problematic is that two-thirds of job losers will not 
return to their previous employer.
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Table 1: Changes in Weeks of Unemployment in Response to Contractionary Episodes 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Less than 5 weeks 5 to 14 weeks 15 or more weeks 27 or more weeks 
Response of: Max Effect Month Max Effect Month Max Effect Month Max Effect Month 
Number of Weeks (in thousands) 26.046 24 53.290 28 42.555 31 29.760 33 
 (1.247)  (3.116)  (2.580)  (2.757)  
Percent Distribution of Weeks -0.924 29-30 0.406 22 0.532 31 0.331 33 
 (-4.278)  (2.105)  (3.213)  (2.875)  
Notes: The table shows the results from the weeks of unemployment distribution on seven own lags, seven lags for the percent change in the 
CPI-U, and 48 lags on the beginning of disinflationary episodes. Each are fourth order polynomials. The detailed results are available from the 
author upon request. 
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Table 2: Changes in Unemployment in Response to Contractionary Episodes 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
 Number ( in thousands) Percentage Points 
Response of: Max Effect Month Max Effect Month 
Job Losers 63.49 32 0.551 30 
 (2.80)  (2.715)  
Job Losers on Layoff 29.20 32 0.357 14 
 (2.40)  (2.214)  
Reentrants into Labor Force 45.73 29 -0.277 20 
 (3.00)  (1.448)  
Quit Job -9.08 40 -0.444 30 
 (1.10)  (4.236)  
New Entrants 33.29 32 0.000 0 
 (4.09)  0.000   
Worked Part-Time 69.49 29 -0.971 32 
 (2.48)  (2.478)  
Notes: The table shows the results for types of unemployment on seven own lags, 
seven lags for the percent change in the CPI-U, and 48 lags on the beginning of 
disinflationary episodes. Each are fourth order polynomials. The detailed results are 
available from the author upon request. 
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APPENDIX 
FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE EXCERPTS 
 
The following are selected quotes from the February 3-4, 1994 and June 29-30, 1999 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. Prior to 1998, the FOMC Secretariat 
produced a transcript that contains member’s names. The detailed transcripts are 
available at www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts. 
 
February 3-4, 1994: 
 
Mr. Forrestal: On the price side, for the first time in a long time our directors have talked 
a little about seeing some price increases.  
 
Mr. Melzer: We project that the CPI will move up sharply in 1994 and will be even high 
in 1995. Indeed, there may be some early warning signs that the economy’s 
disinflationary course has already come to an end. 
 
Ms. Phillips: I think that we’re now seeing some major risks on the inflation front 
 
Vice Chairman Mcdonough: With the unemployment rate coming down to what we think 
is a reasonable estimate of the NAIRU—in the low 6 percent area—we do have to be 
considerably concerned about inflation.   
 
Chairman Greenspan: While we may not find it in the broader price indexes, there was at 
least an inkling that the presumption that inflationary indicators are all quiescent is, as I 
said, sort of fraying at the seems… The presumption that inflation is staying down is very 
hard to maintain. 
 
Vice Chairman Mcdonough: …Send the right signal in the sense that the federal reserve, 
the central bank, is being watchful, as it should be.  And we would be moving earlier in 
the economic cycle than the fed has done historically… 
 
Mr. Jordan: …That 25 basis point move would be viewed clearly as the first of a series of 
moves. 
 
Mr. Boehne: This is as good as it gets in terms of convincing evidence to move. 
 
Mr. Forrestal: We certainly have a demand surge in the fourth quarter and it would 
appear that that is going to continue to some extent. 
 
Mr. Syron: What we all want to do very clearly is to maximize long-term growth in the 
economy, controlling real growth. As Larry Lindsey said, controlling prices is a 
mechanism for doing that. 
 
Chairman Greenspan: (reading the statement he plans to release) …The decision was 
taken to move toward a less accommodative stance in monetary policy in order to sustain 
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and enhance the economic expansion… this is the first firming of reserve market 
conditions by the Committee since early 1989. 
 
June 29-30, 1999: 
 
“The members’ concerns about inflation had increases appreciably since the meeting in 
late March.” 
 
“Indeed, in the absence of some policy firming most of the members saw tightening labor 
markets and an updrift in measured inflation as a significant risk.” 
 
“It remained unclear how long faster gains in productivity could continue be offset 
increases in labor costs and avert an intensification of price inflation” 
 
“Most members had become increasingly worried about the risks of an overheating 
economy and rising inflation over time.” 
 
“The concerns about the outlook for inflation tended to focus on the risk that, in the 
absence of an appreciable moderation in overall demands, very tight labor markets would 
at some point foster significantly faster increases in labor compensation that could no 
longer be offset by stronger productivity growth…. The higher labor cost increases would 
in turn generate more rapid price inflation.” 
 
“The declines in commodity and other import prices that had helped to suppress inflation 
and inflation expectations over the last two years were not likely to be repeated.” 
 
“…An increase of ¼ percentage point in the federal funds rate to an average of around 5 
percent.  In the view of most members, such a policy move represented a desirable and 
cautious preemptive step in the direction of reducing what they saw as a significant risk 
of rising inflation.” 
 
“The persisting strength of domestic demand augmented by increasing demand from 
abroad would show through at some point to even tighter labor markets and higher 
inflation… In these circumstances a small preemptive move at this time would provide a 
degree of insurance against worsening inflation later.” 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Carpenter and Rodgers (Forthcoming, 2004) and Thorbecke (2001). 
 
2 For general studies, see, for example, Badgett (1994), Blank and Blinder (1996), Clark and Summers 
(1981, 1990), Hoynes (2000), Korenman and Okun (1991), Moorthy (1988), Romer and Romer (1998), 
Spriggs and Williams (2000) Shulman (1991), and Wilson, Tienda and Wu (1991). 
 
3For studies on race and ethnicity, see, for example, Freeman (2001), Freeman and Rodgers (2000), 
Hoynes, Hines and Krueger (2001) and Reimers (2000). A second round of studies continues to find gains, 
but they have not made up the lost ground that occurred from the 1970s to 1980s (Holzer and Offner, 2001; 
and Milanovich, 2002). 
 
4 The specifications draw heavily from Carpenter and Rodgers (2004). 
 
5 The importance of industrial production and the CPI-U is well known. It may not be well known that the 
Commodity Research Board spot price is a component of the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ index of 
leading indicators. Our main reason for including total reserves and nonborrowed reserves is to allow direct 
comparability to Thorbecke’s estimates. Christiano et al. show that these two variables have different 
responses to an increase in the Federal Funds Rate. Nonborrowed reserves experience a persistent drop, 
consistent with the existence of a liquidity effect. The drop in total reserves is initially quite small. 
However, over the simulated time horizon of the impulse response function, total reserves fall. The Federal 
Reserve protects short-run reserves by increasing borrowed reserves. As a check for robustness, we 
estimate the VAR with only industrial production, the Consumer Price Index, the labor market outcome and 
the federal funds rate. We obtain qualitatively similar results to the estimates presented in this paper. The 
detailed estimates are available up request. 
 
6 Although not on the scale of September 11th, Bagliano and Favero (1998) find evidence of large residuals 
in 1984 when sudden borrowing increased by Continental Illinois. 
 
7 Immediately after September 11th, the Federal Reserve Board to a variety of actions that led to 
unexplainable (large residuals) movements in reserves. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the Committee established or enlarged reciprocal currency (swap) arrangements with the European 
Central Bank, the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of England. The purpose of these arrangements was to 
facilitate the functioning of U.S. financial markets by providing as necessary through the foreign central 
banks the liquidity in dollars needed by European, Canadian, and British banks whose U.S. operations had 
been disrupted by the disturbances in the United States. On September 17, 2001, the Committee members 
voted unanimously to ease reserve conditions appreciably further, consistent with a reduction in the federal 
funds rate of 50 basis points to a level of 3 percent. In conjunction with these policy moves, the Federal 
Reserve would continue to supply, as needed, an atypically large volume of liquidity to the financial 
system. As a consequence, the Committee recognized that the federal funds rate might fall below its target 
on occasion until more normal conditions were restored in the functioning of the financial system (FOMC 
Transcripts for September 17th, 2001). 
 
8 Excluding the post September 11, 2001 segment of the time series has no impact on the standard 
deviations. They range from 1.23 to 1.26. 
 
9 The VARs and impulse response functions are estimated using STATA Version 8.0.  
 
10 The impulse response functions for the 1959:7 to 2002:9 series are similar. At less than 5 weeks of 
unemployment, the number of unemployed reaches its maximum of 22,900 in the 24th month. At 5 to 14 
weeks, the maximum increase of 23,300 is reached in month 26. At 15 or more weeks, the number reaches 
its maximum of 42,980 by the 32nd month and 24,500 by the 35th month in the 27 weeks or more category. 
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11 I suppose that if workers are close watchers of the Federal Reserve, the number might fall. People realize 
that the labor market will become slacker, creating fewer opportunities. 
Figure 1: The Effect of Positive Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate on 
the Number of Unemployed
(in Thousands)
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Notes: The figures plot the impulse response functions of the impact  of a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate has on a particular segment of the weeks
Of unemployment distribution. The ordering is a follows: industrial production growth, the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, the log of the
Commodity Research Board spot price index,  weeks of unemployment, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. 
They are entered in the model in the order as they are listed. The system uses 6 lags and estimation starts in September 1973 with the sample extending 
to September 2002. The dashed lines are lower and upper bounds of 95% Confidence Intervals  that come from bootstrapped samples of 500 replications.
Figure 2: The Effect of Positive Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate on 
the Percent Unemployed by Length of Unemployment
Less than 5 Weeks
-0.60%
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Months
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
P
o
i
n
t
s
5 to 14 Weeks
-0.60%
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Months
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
P
o
i
n
t
s
At Least 15 Weeks
-0.60%
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Months
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
P
o
i
n
t
s
At Least 27 Weeks
-0.60%
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Months
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
P
o
i
n
t
s
Notes: The figures plot the impulse response functions of the impact  of a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate has on a particular segment of the weeks
Of unemployment distribution. The ordering is a follows: industrial production growth, the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, the log of the
Commodity Research Board spot price index,  weeks of unemployment in percent, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. 
They are entered in the model in the order as they are listed. The system uses 6 lags and estimation starts in September 1973 with the sample extending 
to September 2002. The dashed lines are lower and upper bounds of 95% Confidence Intervals  that come from bootstrapped samples of 500 replications.
Figure 3: The Effect of Positive Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate on 
the Types of Unemployed
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Notes: The figures plot the impulse response functions of the impact  of a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate has on a particular segment of the weeks
Of unemployment distribution. The ordering is a follows: industrial production growth, the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, the log of the
Commodity Research Board spot price index,  job losers, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. 
They are entered in the model in the order as they are listed. The system uses 6 lags and estimation starts in September 1973 with the sample extending 
to September 2002. The dashed lines are lower and upper bounds of 95% Confidence Intervals  that come from bootstrapped samples of 500 replications.
Figure 4: The Effect of Positive Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate on 
the Types of Unemployed
Labor Force New  Entrants
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Notes: The figures plot the impulse response functions of the impact  of a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate has on a particular segment of the weeks
Of unemployment distribution. The ordering is a follows: industrial production growth, the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, the log of the
Commodity Research Board spot price index,  type of unemployment, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. 
They are entered in the model in the order as they are listed. The system uses 6 lags and estimation starts in September 1973 with the sample extending 
to September 2002. The dashed lines are lower and upper bounds of 95% Confidence Intervals  that come from bootstrapped samples of 500 replications.
Figure 5: The Effect of Positive Innovations in the Federal Funds Rate on 
the Types of Unemployed
Reentrants into the Labor Force
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Notes: The figures plot the impulse response functions of the impact  of a one-standard-deviation increase in the federal funds rate has on a particular segment of the weeks
Of unemployment distribution. The ordering is a follows: industrial production growth, the percent change in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, the log of the
Commodity Research Board spot price index, type of unemployment, the federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, and total reserves. 
They are entered in the model in the order as they are listed. The system uses 6 lags and estimation starts in September 1973 with the sample extending 
to September 2002. The dashed lines are lower and upper bounds of 95% Confidence Intervals  that come from bootstrapped samples of 500 replications.
